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Analysis of Resource Allocation through Game Theory
An Honors Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for Honors in
Mathematical Science.
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ABSTRACT

Game theory presents a set of decision-makers in a model in order to simulate how
they will interact according to a set of rules. The game is set up with a set of players,
actions, and preferences. The model allows each player to, in some way, be affected
by the actions of all players. Nash equilibrium illustrates that the best action for any
given player depends on the other players’ actions, and so, each player must make
some assumption about what the competition will do. The goal of this project is to
model situations of different car companies to improve our understanding of how
they will allocate their resources. In our case, the players will be two car
manufacturers. The actions of the players will be how each company invests its
resources with some particular vehicle, make or model, and the preferences will be
what each company wants to spend the most resources on. The payoff functions
will be generated for each player that will also represent the preferences under
given assumptions of each player’s activities. By finding the Nash equilibrium of the
“game”, a stable activity table will be concluded and compared with the
manufacturers’ choices and gains in reality.
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1. Introduction
In the study of economics, one aims to invest their money, time, and
resources in general to produce a profit. However, there are many factors that affect
an investment: for example, competition within the market, demand of the
consumer, and cost of production, which includes labor and materials. With all
factors considered, sometimes strategies for producing a profit are not at all
obvious. Instead, one must reallocate their resources wisely in order to break even,
minimize their losses, or maximize the profit. As an example, car manufacturers
choose certain models from their showroom for which they will invest the majority
of their resources based on the demands of society, costs, potential competitors, etc.
In finance, the cost-volume formula is applied to determine production cost
given a certain number of units. Production costs include any fixed or variable
expenses incurred when a
business provides goods or
services. Fixed costs do not
increase or decrease regardless
of the output. They are constant
and independent of business
activity, for example, the lease
payment owed on a building.

Figure 1: Cost-Volume Formula

Variable costs, on the
other hand, fluctuate
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depending on how many goods are produced or how much service is provided.
Materials and labor are examples of variable costs. Together, fixed costs and
variable costs make up total production cost. See Figure 1 for an illustration of the
cost-volume formula.
Game theory, introduced in 1944 by John von Neumann and Oskar
Morgenstern (Ross, 2012), models a situation where two or more decision makers
interact. Each strategic game consists of a set of players, a set of actions, and player
preferences in regards to their actions. Player is a generic term that can be used to
represent firms, political candidates, or prisoners like in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
example explained in the following section. Actions represent the players’ decisions
or allocation of resources. The preferences, in our setting, are the pay-off function
or the profit a player can expect.

2. Introduction to Game Theory
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is one of the simplest examples of a two-player game
(see, for instance, Osborne, 2000). For this game, there are two suspects being held
in separate cells. There is enough evidence against each suspect to convict them of a
minor offense, but the only way to convict either one of a major crime is if the other
suspect acts as an informer and ‘finks’ to the authorities. Under this situation, both
prisoners serve a minor sentence if neither finks; but finking results in a reduction
penalty; staying quiet, however, has the risk of receiving the maximum penalty if the
other prisoner finks. The table below illustrates the game between the two players:
4

Table 1. The Prisoner's Dilemma
Suspect 2

Suspect 1

Quiet

Fink

Quiet

2,2

0,3

Fink

3,0

1,1

In Table 1, one player chooses from the row actions (Q/F) and the other from
the columns. The numerical values correspond to the preferences of each player
under each scenario with higher values representing a higher pay-off, which in our
case is less prison time. For example, from the entry [3,0], suspect 1 finks and
suspect 2 remains quiet, which would result in a higher pay-off for suspect 1 and
maximum prison time for suspect 2, consequently, the minimum pay-off.

3. Nash Equilibrium
Nash equilibrium is a concept of game theory where the optimal outcome for
the model is one where no player has an incentive to change their decision after
considering the decision of their opponent.

Thus, the player would gain no

advantage from having deviated from their original action assuming their
opponent’s strategy was held constant. Any particular game could have several
Nash equilibria or none at all. This concept was named after its creator, Nobel Prize
winner John Forbes Nash, Jr., who published an article in 1950 introducing this
notion of equilibrium for n-person games. The concept has been applied in both
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economics and behavioral sciences and has since become the centerpiece of modern
game theory (Holt, 2004, 3999-4002).
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma example in Table 2, Nash equilibrium can be
accomplished when both players ‘fink’ represented by the last cell, (1,1). For
example, referring to the bottom row of Table 1, say player 1 chooses to ‘fink’;
player 2 is better off also choosing ‘fink’ to yield the highest possible payoff given
the first player’s action. Given that player 2 chooses ‘fink’, we see from the table,
player 1 would also choose to ‘fink’ between a payoff of zero for remaining quiet and
a payoff of one for finking. Analyzing the first cell, (2,2) meaning ‘quiet’, ‘quiet’, both
players will want to deviate from their action to receive a higher payoff knowing
that their opponent chose ‘quiet’. Consequently, the only Nash equilibrium of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma is when both players ‘fink’ because the incentive to go free
eliminates the mutually desirable outcome (2,2) where both players remain ‘quiet’
(see, for instance, Osborne, 2000).

4. Competing Car Manufacturers
In this note, we seek to propose a model that illustrates the competition
between two car manufacturers, Toyota and Ford, and how they allocate their
resources according to their preferences and the restrictions of the market.
Table 2 below shows the data collected. This includes the unit prices and
sales statistics for the two manufacturers for each of the three models under
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consideration. The unit price recorded represents the most generic version of each
model. Also, the sales statistics were divided into three four-month periods for the
year for simpler calculations.

Table 2.
Amount Sold Yearly in the US
Make

Model

Starting Price

2012
Jan-Apr

May-Aug

Sept-Dec

Toyota

Corolla

$16,800.00

90176

106445

91270

Ford

Focus

$16,605.00

85468

81482

78972

Toyota

Camry

$22,235.00

142224

138311

124350

Ford

Fusion

$21,900.00

85559

96306

59398

Toyota

Sienna

$26,585.00

33648

44634

36440

Ford

Explorer

$29,600.00

47731

56023

60433

First we consider the simple model where we let Xp be the percent of the
price that indicates profit. We will let Xp be fixed and equal 2/3. We then find the
amount of profit each manufacturer would earn from selling one model. For
example, the starting price for a Toyota Corolla is $16,800.00, and two-thirds of this
is $11,200.
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Table 3.

Toyota

Corolla
Camry
Sienna

Focus
11200, 11070
14823.33, 11070
17723.33, 11070

Ford
Fusion
11200, 14600
14823.33, 14600
17723.33, 14600

Explorer
11200, 19733.33
14823.33, 19733.33
17723.33, 19733.33

From Table 3, when only considering the price and profit ratio, it would
indicate that both companies should invest their resources in selling SUVs. The last
entry indicates that Nash equilibrium can be achieved, but using what we know
about the market, this would not make sense. This is actually an invalid conclusion
because there is not infinite demand for SUVs due to gas prices and whether or not
the vehicle is for a family or an individual. Also, if both companies channeled all
resources into manufacturing and selling SUVs there would be greater competition
to appeal to the fixed number of consumers looking to buy an SUV, meaning both
companies would miss out on another population entirely that is interested in a
coupe or a sedan.
Building on the previous table, we analyze price with number of models sold
to determine the price to profit ratio for Table 4. For example, for a Toyota Corolla,
we multiply starting price by the number of Corollas sold between January and April
of 2012. From the data collected in Table 2, the starting price is $16,800, and the
amount sold is 90,176, which yields 1,514,956,800. This introduces the demand for
a particular model into the table.
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Table 4.

Focus
Corolla 1514956800,
1419196140
Toyota Camry 3162350640,
1419196140
Sienna 894532080,
1419196140

Ford
Fusion
1514956800,
1873742100
3162350640,
1873742100
894532080,
1873742100

Explorer
1514956800,
1412837600
3162350640,
1412837600
894532080,
1412837600

Table 4 indicates that the consideration of demand for any one model forces
the Nash equilibrium to the center, the entry “Camry, Fusion”, (3162350640,
1873742100). This makes more sense in reality than the afore mentioned Nash
equilibrium because selling one SUV compared to one sedan would always be more
profitable due to the higher price. However, from what we know about the market,
more consumers are buying these sedans, and in the long run, the larger number of
sales overcomes the greater unit price. All things considered, if both companies
invest all their resources into a mid-sized sedan, they will be competing for one
population of consumers, again one company will control the market and the other
will be missing out on the population in demand of a larger vehicle or the market
will be divided and neither company will return a significant profit.
For more practical purposes, Table 5 introduces the demand of the entire
market as opposed to the demand for just a particular vehicle. Thus, we are
calculating the price to profit ratio similar to Table 4, but are considering the
consumers who purchased both the comparable Ford vehicle and Toyota vehicle.
Recall that, we multiplied the starting price by the amount sold for Corollas between
January and April of 2012, which yielded 1,514,956,800. Now, we divide
9

1,514,956,800 by the sum of 90,176 and 85,468, which represents the number of
consumers who purchased both Toyota Corollas and Ford Focuses, because the
Focus is the most comparable model to the Corolla in the Ford showroom.

Table 5.

Focus
Corolla 8625.155,
8079.958
Toyota Camry 13883.172,
8079.958
Sienna 10992.173,
8079.958

Ford
Fusion
8625.155,
8225.996
13883.172,
8225.996
10992.173,
8225.996

Explorer
8625.155,
17361.206
13883.172,
17361.206
10992.173,
17361.206

In this most complex model thus far, the Nash equilibrium is the cell for
Camry, Explorer, (13883.172, 17361.206). This indicates that Toyota profits more
from the section of the market represented by the mid-sized sedan and that Ford
controls the sports-utility sector, suggesting that Toyota invests the majority of its
resources in production of the Camry and Ford invests the majority of its resources
in production of the Explorer. We find this to be true for today’s market. Once
again, this is more realistic then the Nash equilibrium from Table 4 that suggested
both companies invested in their competitive mid-sized sedans. Our new, modified
Nash equilibrium for Table 5 allows both companies to profit from different sectors
of the market.
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5. Mixed Strategy
As one can see, when we progressively consider the factors from reality,
different Nash equilibriums appear in different models, resulting in different
preferences between the two manufacturers. However, maximizing the profit, as
one can imagine, relies on not investing all resources in the same model. And here is
where the more advanced game theoretical study, in terms of mixed strategies,
comes into play.
A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium where each player chooses his or her
actions probabilistically is referred to as stochastic. This particular action profile
requires a steady state in which every player’s behavior is constant or the behavior
pattern remains constant each time the game is played, and no player wishes to
deviate knowing another player’s action. The following is an example of a stochastic
steady state (Osborne, 98).

Table 6. Matching Pennies
Player 2

Player 1

Head

Head
$1, -$1

Tail
-$1, $1

Tail

-$1, $1

$1, -$1

This game is setup with two players who will simultaneously show either the
head side or the tail side of a penny. When both players show the same side, player
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2 must pay player 1 a dollar; player 1 will pay player 2 a dollar if the sides are
different. The payoff for this game will be the amount of money involved. And in
regards to player preferences, player 1 wants to make the same action as player 2,
and player 2 hopes to have the opposite action of player 1. Thus, player 1 and
player 2’s preferences will always conflict.
Let’s assume player 2 chooses Head with probability q, then he or she
chooses Tail by 1-q. Say player 1 chooses Head with probability p; player 1 will earn
$1 with probability pq + (1 – p)(1 – q) denoting that the outcome is either (Head,
Head) or (Tail, Tail). Player 2 earns $1 by (1 – p)q + p(1 – q), an outcome of either
(Head, Tail) or (Tail, Head). After distributing and combining like terms the first
probability becomes 1 – q + p(2q – 1); the second simplifies to q + p(1 – 2q). If we
let the value of q be less than ½, then player 2 chooses Head less than half of the
times the game is played. From the two equations, we see that the first payoff
function is decreasing in the variable p and the second is increasing in p. Then, the
value of p that gives player 1 the best opportunity to win is zero. In conclusion, if
player 2 chooses Head with a probability less than ½, then player 1 should choose
Tail with certainty and similarly, if player 2 chooses Head by more than ½, player 1
should choose Head on every play (Osborne, 98-99).
This particular game has no Nash equilibrium, but in a stochastic steady
state, each player chooses his or her action with probability ½. To see this, suppose
that our first player chooses each of his actions with probability ½. If our second
player chooses Head with probability p, he chooses Tail with probability 1-p. This
means the outcomes (Head, Head) and (Head, Tail) each occur by probability ½p,
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and the outcomes (Tail, Tail) and (Tail, Head) happen with probability ½(1 – p).
Applying basic algebra we determine player 2 wins $1 with the probability ½p +
½(1 – p), which simplifies to ½. Thus, player 2 also loses $1 with probability ½, and
can do no better than choose either Head or Tail with probability ½, indicating
every value of p is optimal. Switching the roles of player 1 and player 2, player 1
would also choose Head or Tail with probability ½, so we have a stochastic steady
state for Matching Pennies when the players choose their actions by ½ (Osborne,
98).

6. Dynamic Model
A cube root function can depict the relationship between the quantity of
vehicles sold and the profit returned for a particular make and model. The curve of
a cube root approaches a horizontal asymptote from either direction and changes
concavity. Our relationship can be illustrated by the following function:
ሺሻ ൌ ሺ  ሻ

ൗ




ሺሻ ൌ 
ሺሻ ൌ ሺሻ
where s denotes the quantity sold and p denotes profit.
We must include the technical coefficient two for the cube root so that there
is always a solution to the equation. This function best fits the data set because the
more vehicles produced will return a greater profit up until a given point, where the
profit increases at a decreasing rate, eventually leveling off. We will let our
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breakeven point, the point on the curve where there is a change in concavity, be
determined by the historical data.
Referring back to Table 2, we see that between January and April 2012,
Toyota sold 90,176 Corollas. Utilizing our fixed proportion Xp, we multiply the price
by 2/3 to obtain $11,200, which recall is the profit from selling one Corolla, and then
multiplying that by our total quantity sold, 90,176, gives us $100.9 million. Our
breakeven point for the graph modeling the relationship between number of
vehicles sold and profit for a Toyota Corolla has the ordered pair, (90176 , 100.9).
We use the same procedure to obtain the breakeven point for Ford Focus, which we
find to be (85468, 946.1). The graphs for both models are displayed below.

Profit (p) (in millions)

100.9

0

Breakeven
point

90176

Quantity sold (s)
Figure 2: Profit versus Quantity Sold for Toyota Corollas
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Profit (p) (in millions)

946.1

0

Breakeven
point

85468

Quantity sold (s)
Figure 3: Profit versus Quantity Sold for Ford Focuses

Notice the curves for the two vehicles are not identical. However, any change
in either function directly affects its competitor. The slope and altitude of the curve
is constantly changing and consequently, the breakeven point also moves along the
curve.
This relationship, when considered in a dynamic setting, introduces more
mathematical components into the game theoretical model. If we let our function be
modeled by the derivative:
′ ሺሻ ൌ




Where F denotes the sales for Ford Focus and C denotes the sales for Toyota Corolla.
Then the curve is the integral of that function:
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න ′ ሺሻ ൌ න




From here, it is obvious that any increase or decrease in the sales of Corollas will
change the dynamic of the graph for Ford Focus and vice versa.

7. Concluding Remarks
In our game theory model, our players are the two car manufacturers Ford
and Toyota. Their actions are defined by how they invested their resources in a
certain make or model. By finding the Nash equilibrium of the three “games” we
proposed, a stable activity table was concluded and compared with the
manufacturers’ choices and gains in reality. We further established the groundwork
of the dynamic modeling system that considers the constant changes of each
player’s choices and preferences.
The models and methodologies presented here are not limited to the study of
manufacturers or companies in general. Any financial scenario between multiple
competitors can be examined through our approach.

16

References
Holt, Charles A. and Roth, Alvin E., “The Nash Equilibrium: a perspective”, Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (vol. 101 no. 12), Vernon L.
Smith (ed.), URL = <http://www.pnas.org/content/101/12/3999.full?tab=author-info>.
Osborne, Martin J., “An Introduction to Game Theory”, (2000).
Ross, Don, "Game Theory", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL=<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/gametheory/>.

17

